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Saturday, 27 September 2014

Qatar’s Support of Hamas and Jihadist Forces in the Middle East

Right Side News 27 September 2014

Qatar is unquestionably engaged in international terrorist financing. According to the U.S. Treasury’s division for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, "Qatar, a longtime U.S. ally, has for many years openly financed Hamas.”

Qatar aids Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jabhat al Nusra, al-Qaeda affiliates, Libyan Islamists, and even ISIS.

The key Qatari link to the Muslim Brotherhood has been Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who broadcasts on Qatar’s al Jazeera. In 2002, his foundation was designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. government.

Through the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar has attempted to undermine Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Qatar’s ruling Al Thani family believe they are "worthy of challenging Riyadh [Saudi Arabia].”

During the third Gaza War, known in Israel as Operation Protective Edge, there was one striking news report in the pan-Arab daily, al-Hayat, claiming that the Qatari government threatened to evict the head of the Hamas political bureau, Khaled Mashaal, in the event that his organization accepted the latest Egyptian proposal for a cease fire. Mashaal had resisted all diplomatic efforts up until that time to bring the conflict to an end since mid-July, even when many of the front line senior commanders of Hamas in Gaza preferred to reach a halt in the fighting.1

Whether the report in al-Hayat is accurate or not, it has been an open secret for a considerable period of time that Qatar has been engaged in terrorist financing through its assistance to Hamas. On March 4, 2014, David Cohen, the U.S. Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, disclosed: "Qatar, a longtime U.S. ally, has for many years openly financed Hamas…”2

In addition, Qatar provided a base from which Khaled Mashaal could run Hamas operations. But now it had become clear that Qatar was not only providing a convenient sanctuary for the most hard-line part of the Hamas leadership, but it also took an active part in seeing that Mashaal maintained this position. Rather than help resolve the conflict, it appeared that Qatar wanted to prolong and even exacerbate it.
Qatar and Terrorist Financing

On the surface, the ties between Qatar and terrorist financing do not make sense. Most of the emirates along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf are known to be politically conservative –and not revolutionary. In contrast to Iran, they are status-quo powers. Qatar, moreover, has developed close defense ties with the United States; since 2003, the forward headquarters of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has been located at the al-Udaid airbase in Qatar. Nevertheless, at the same time, Qatar has forged ties with some of the most problematic movements in the Middle East. In that sense, Qatar’s outreach to Hamas is not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a broader trend in Qatari foreign policy, which has serviced much of the jihadist network in the Middle East and not just Hamas.

For example, in June 2013, the Taliban were permitted to open a quasi-diplomatic office in Qatar. In December 2013, the US Department of the Treasury announced a prominent Qatari was backing al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria and Iraq. The charity official, Abd al-Rahman bin Umayr al-Nu’aymi, was a professor at Qatar University and had served as an adviser to government-backed charities in Qatar. But he was also a conduit for Qatari-based donors and the al-Qaeda network.3 Another Qatari charity has been mentioned by Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate fighting in Syria, as a preferred vehicle for funding. Another Middle Eastern source has stated that Qatar shares in the responsibility for Jabhat al-Nusra having "money and weapons and everything they need.”4

The Qatari role in terrorist financing keeps emerging in many locations. The UN Security Council approved the addition of six individuals to the al-Qaeda sanctions list on August 15, 2014, including Hamid Hamad al-Ali, who, it maintained, had participated in financing the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).5 Al-Ali actively solicited contributions in a video appeal filmed in Qatar.

Qatar was also active in North Africa. The French press carried repeated reports that Qatar was financing jihadist elements in Northern Mali, including MUJAO (the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), Ansar Dine (affiliated with al-Qaeda), and even secularist Tuareg separatists belonging to the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad). There were also reports quoting the French Directorate of Intelligence (DRM) claiming that Qatar was financing AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb). Prior to the French intervention in Mali, its northern region was emerging as an African Afghanistan. Notably, the Qatari Red Crescent was the only humanitarian organization operating in Northern Mali after the Islamist takeover.

Qatar also has extensive ties to Islamist elements fighting in Libya since Qaddafi’s overthrow.6 Sheikh Ali al-Salabi was a Libyan Islamist with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood who took refuge in Qatar in 1999 but later returned to Libya, where he served as a conduit for Qatari-supplied arms to Islamist forces. Indeed, after Qaddafi’s fall, Libya’s transitional prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, complained that Qatar was still arming extremist groups in Libya opposed to his leadership.7 (continue reading...)

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