Whoever replaces Egypt's president might not prove such a staunch ally of the US, writes Con Coughlin.
Political revolts have an uncanny knack of catching even the best-prepared administrations off guard, as Barack Obama is discovering in the wake of the sudden eruption of unrest in Egypt.
The US employs a small army of officials and experts whose sole purpose is to predict and plan for such eventualities. And while they often succeed in preventing conflict – the recent establishment of Kosovo's independence is a case in point – there have been some notable failures. Few policy-makers in Washington – or London, for that matter – foresaw either the Shah's overthrow in Iran or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, while all the Western powers were completely wrong-footed by the speed with which the Iron Curtain collapsed a decade later. In Egypt over the past week, the White House has been desperately playing catch up with a pro-democracy movement whose rapid development seems to have taken it by surprise.
This is the first major international crisis to test Obama's leadership on the world stage. It must be particularly irksome for a president who, in June 2009, chose the gilded splendour of Cairo University as the venue for his ground-breaking appeal to the Muslim world to end the "cycle of suspicion and discord" with the US.
In that speech, Obama called for a "new beginning" to the relationship between Washington and the Arab world. At the time, it was generally understood that his main priority was to kick-start peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. There was certainly no suggestion that he sought radical changes to the region's status quo. On the contrary, in his brief reference to the issue of democracy, he said: "America does not presume to know what is best for everyone. No system can or should be imposed on one nation by any other."
Well, tell that to Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian president, who just under two years ago was happy to host an American president set on improving his standing in the Middle East, now finds himself subjected to demands from the White House that he step down immediately to make way for a more democratic system of government.
Precisely how the removal of Mubarak squares with Obama's desire to revive the Middle East peace talks remains unclear. Winning agreement on a lasting settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is, after all, supposed to be one of the administration's key policy objectives. In that context, Mubarak has been a valuable and reliable ally, often risking criticism from his political opponents in Egypt by acting as an honest broker to facilitate talks between negotiators on both sides. But the moment Mubarak was challenged by a nationwide campaign for reform by anti-government protesters, this long-serving president found himself surplus to requirements. Obama now believes that America's interests will be better served by the forces of democratic reform being unleashed in Cairo than by sticking with the man who has been Washington's most important regional ally for the past three decades.
Whether this judgment proves to be correct depends on how the Egyptian crisis is resolved. If it leads to the creation of a truly democratic, pro-Western government that remains committed to regional peace and stability, then Obama will feel vindicated.
If, on the other hand, Mubarak is replaced by a regime that is hostile to Western interests – which will certainly be the case if the Muslim Brotherhood seizes power – then Obama will live to regret ever having extolled the virtues of Egyptian democracy, just as Jimmy Carter must rue the day that he ever subjected the Shah to a lecture on Iran's human rights record.
Obama should also reflect on the impact his abandonment of Mubarak is likely to have on America's other close regional allies. Unlike Egypt, a self-confident country that traces its origins to an ancient civilization, states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan are relatively recent creations of the post-colonial era.
Many Arabs still bitterly resent the arbitrary carve-up of their land that took place at the end of the First World War, and which resulted in the creation of many anomalies. Modern Jordan, for example, includes a narrow strip that extends into Iraq and is known locally as "Winston's hiccup", because the only logical explanation for its existence is that it was created when Winston Churchill was drawing the boundary following a good lunch.
Consequently, the leaders of these countries are wracked with insecurity about the legitimacy of their position, and resort to violence whenever confronted with any serious challenge to their rule. In the 1970s, when Yasser Arafat attempted to overthrow King Hussein in the Black September revolt, the Jordanian monarch responded by killing and expelling thousands of Palestinians.
Without US backing, there is every likelihood that the current generation of Arab autocrats will resort to similarly violent measures if they come under serious threat from pro-democracy campaigners. If that happens, Obama's hopes for an orderly transition to real democracy throughout the Arab world will end in nothing more than bloodshed.
